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CONSCIENCE, COERCION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: THE
BEGINNING OF AN END TO THE
WANDERING OF A WAYWARD
JUDICIARY?
Rodney K Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has given mixed signals
regarding its role in protecting religious liberty on Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause grounds. This article discusses one such
signal - a signal given in the Establishment Clause context.
I argue that the Court is moving toward using the term "con-
science," as opposed to "religion," in Establishment Clause analy-
sis. This move may portend a larger agenda for the Court - one
that might well expand protection for religious and related liberty.
However, the interrelated nature of the Supreme Court's Establish-
ment and Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence limits one's ability to
predict with confidence the Court's direction.
Section II of this article endeavors to place Establishment
Clause analysis in a doctrinal context, using two continuums to aid
in that enterprise. The section explores the doctrinal categories and
relates them to notions of endorsement and coercion.
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ter. I am grateful to Professors David Gregory, Don Hughes, Dan Kobil, Tim Lytton and
members of the Capital University Law School faculty who critiqued an early version of
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I wpuld also like to thank Jeff Hickman, Tony Kaye and the editorial staff at the Case
Western Reserve Law Review, my research assistants, Hu Guang and Moses Ndjarakana
and my secretary, Linda Rodichok, for their assistance in preparing the manuscript for
publication.
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Section III documents the Court's use of a conscience-based
category for permissible government accommodation of religious
activity under the Establishment Clause. In using the broader term
conscience, as opposed to the more restrictive term religion, the
Court may be providing the doctrinal basis for an expanded future
accommodation of conscience.
Section IV poses several questions regarding the Court's possi-
ble move to a conscience based test, even though the Court may
not intend such an ambitious project at all. Indeed, there is sub-
stantial evidence that the Court is inclined to defer to government
power, whether accommodating religious exercise under the Estab-
lishment Clause or in restricting it by rejecting free exercise chal-
lenges to government action. Nevertheless, even if conscience is
used to buttress a deferential interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, the other branches of government might begin to facilitate
the exercise of conscience through accommodations permitted under
the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Despite a
restricted reading by the Court of the Free Exercise Clause, an
expanded reading of the Establishment Clause together with a
Congress willing to facilitate the exercise of religious liberty might
provide the basis for a revitalization of religious liberty. Relatedly,
a conscience-based interpretation of the Establishment Clause would
permit efforts under state constitutions to accommodate the exercise
of conscience, and thereby increase liberty. If such a project to
promote the liberty of conscience under the Establishment Clause is
in its initial stages, the Court should answer the questions noted in
Section IV.
A complete delineation of a theory, which might provide the
foundation for a major move toward protecting the right of con-
science, is beyond the scope of this article.1 Nevertheless, I offer
some reasons why such answers should be sought and why a pro-
ject seeking to promote the right of conscience is worthwhile.
1. The limited agenda described in this article is sufficiently extensive and daunting.
The editors of this law review are willing to indulge my elaboration of some of the
problems that attend what may be a very major move on the part of the Court in devel-
oping Establishment Clause analysis. Answering those questions, however, is beyond the
scope of a single article and the time currently available to the writer, who lives another
life as a law school dean.
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II. CATEGORIES AVAILABLE TO THE COURT IN DEVELOPING
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
In two recent Establishment Clause cases, the Supreme Court
has evidenced its inclination to permit government accommodation
of matters of conscience. Before discussing those cases, however, it
will be helpful to develop the context into which they fit, by ex-
amining various potential Establishment Clause ,categories.
I previously have expounded on these categories in some
detail2 and will, therefore, merely summarize them in this article.
After placing the views on a continuum, I will construct a related
continuum that stretches from government endorsement and spon-
sorship of religion through accommodation and neutrality and on to
complete exclusion of religion from the public sector. I will briefly
discuss the point on the continuum at which respect for religious
exercises is maximized and coercion is minimized. I will then
place two recent Establishment Clause cases within that framework.
B. Various Views of the Establishment Clause
At one end of the continuum is the theocratic view that gov-
ernment may promote a particular religion. Essentially, this view
provides that the government may promote a national religion,
excluding all others.3 This view would give the government the
broadest power relative to promotion of a religion in the public
sector. It should be noted, as well, that such a preferential view (a
view preferring one religion over all others) could be implemented
in a tolerant (tolerating other nonpreferred religions and religious
exercise generally) or an intolerant manner (refusing to tolerate
nonpreferred religions and religious exercise).4
2. See Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferendalism in Establishment Clause Analysis: A Re-
sponse to Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 245, 247-52 (1991) [hereinafter
Smith, Response]; Rodney K. Smith, Establishment Clause Analysis: A Liberty Maximizing
Proposal, 4 NOTRE DAME I.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 463, 488-509 (1990) [hereinafter
Smith, Liberty]. Throughout this article, and particularly in this section, I engage in what
appears to be a vain exercise - I repeatedly cite to my own work. Reflecting upon that
exercise, I have concluded that it is better to risk the appearance of vanity than to
exhaustively reiterate past work, without citation, unduly trying the patience of the reader
and diverting attention from the project at hand.
3. See RODNEY K. SMmI, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION 102-03 (1987)
(arguing that such a view is inconsistent with the Framers' intent). Such a theocratic view
has never been adopted by the Supreme Court.
4. See id. at 40 (stating that the common view of the government's role in religion
1993]
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Moving away from the preferentialist view, the next position
on the continuum is the view that government may promote nonde-
nominational Christianity, but may not prefer a particular sect in
doing so.5 This view may, in turn, extend from the view that gov-
ernment may promote nondenominational Christianity of a
Protestant sort to a more inclusive view that would include other
views of Christianity, including Roman Catholic, Mormon, Jehovah
Witness and other versions of non-Protestant Christianity. It may
also be tolerant or nontolerant of other views, although Justice
Story argued for a tolerant version.6 The next, and somewhat relat-
ed, point on the continuum would permit the government to pro-
mote religion of a Judaeo-Christian sort, and would permit promo-
tion of Judaism together with Christianity. A final related, and
somewhat broadened, category would include all the Jerusalem-
based religions, including Judaism, Christianity and Islam.7
The next points on the continuum represent three views that I
have labelled nonpreferentialist: nonpreferentialism as to religion,
nonpreferentialism as to matters of conscience, and nonpreference
between religion and nonreligion. Professor Laycock has labelled
the third position, nonpreference between religion and nonreligion,
substantive neutrality.9
The nonpreferentialism as to religion view would permit gov-
ernment to facilitate or accommodate religion, so long as it did so
in a manner that did not prefer one religion over another. Thus,
benefits conferred or exemption from government sanctions offered
to one religion would have to be offered to all others. 10
at the time of the Revolution was one of tolerant preference).
5. I have previously referred to this view as the Story view, naming it after Justice
Joseph Story, its major early proponent. SMITH, supra note 3, at 109-10; Smith, Liberty,
supra note 2, at 490.
6. SMITH, supra note 3, at 109-10.
7. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LovE AND POWER 78 (1991) (noting that these religions
are both political and prophetic).
8. See generally Smith, Response, supra note 2, at 250-52 (defining
nonpreferentialism); Smith, Liberty, supra note 2, at 492 (discussing nonpreferentialism).
9. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality'Toward Reli-
gion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990). The label - neutrality or nonpreference
between religion - is not of great consequence. Nevertheless, since Professor Laycock's
view focuses on both equality of impact and facial equality, the view may more appropri-
ately be designated as a nonpreferentialist view. See Smith, Response, supra note 2, at
270 n.93 (arguing that the examination of actual inequalities of impact is nonpreferential
analysis).
10. But see Smith, Liberty, supra note 2, at 502 (stating that the government is likely
to give accommodation which benefits only one religion, under the guise of treating all
920 [Vol. 43:917
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The nonpreferentialism as to matters of conscience position,
the view that government may accommodate conscience when it
does so in a manner that does not prefer one form of conscience
over another, broadens the class being accommodated from religion
to conscience. In doing so, some of the definitional problems that
arise when the class is limited to religions are minimized," al-
though other problems arise.12
The final nonpreferentialist position - the position that gov-
ernment must accommodate religion and nonreligion alike -
broadens the class being accommodated even further. 13 Not only
does it preclude government from discriminating against religion in
general legislation, but it also requires that nonreligion or nonreli-
gious views be afforded the same weight as religious ones in any
accommodation.
The final view on the continuum is the view that government
may do nothing to accommodate or otherwise permit religion to
have any role in the public sector. This exclusionary view has been
religions equally).
11. See id. (conscience will include less conventional religions or views that by their
nature are akin to religion because it is more over-inclusive).
12. See infra part IT.A.
13. Nonpreferentialism between religion and nonreligion broadens the class to the point
that it is virtually meaningless as a means of effectuating policy choices:
mhe best that can be said for the nonpreference between religion and
nonreligion view is that it eliminates particularized accommodation for religion
or conscience. While such a neutralization of religion or conscience appears to
eliminate the potential for exclusion of some minorities or outsiders, it does
little to "strengthen their community bond" through "embracement" or accom-
modation. Furthermore, the nonpreference between religion and nonreligion view
may not even succeed in its goal of avoiding a sense of exclusion from the
polity on the part of religious and nonreligious minorities. If "nonreligion" is
read broadly and inclusively, it has the effect of simply eliminating both leg-
islative and judicial exemptions on religious or matters of conscience grounds.
In effect, it emphasizes a secular state, and would apply all general legislative
regulations in an evenhanded manner, refusing to provide for exemptions. If all
religious and nonreligious groups were to be exempted from a given legislative
act, the act itself would be without force or effect. In other words, everyone
could be exempted from the act, if any one was, and thus, no exemptions or
accommodations could be made. Furthermore, given that such general laws or
regulations would be promulgated by the majority in the polity, and applied to
everyone (minority and majority alike), it would not be surprising to find that
such general laws were particularly pemicious in terms of their potential for
institutional coercion of minorities.
Smith, Liberty, supra note 2, at 507. This potential for exclusion and coercion of minori-
ties would be increased where the Court merely defers to the majoritarian branches of the
government.
1993]
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referred to as the strict separationist view. 14 Because this view
seeks to separate or exclude all religion from the public sector and
from that which is secular, it has been contended that it is hostile
to religion and religious exercise, 5 particularly given the increas-
ingly pervasive nature of the public sector. However, since the
elected officials who make the policy decisions probably cannot
check religious views at the door of the legislature, this view may
be impractical. At a minimum, it may require that religious lan-
guage and actions be veiled when used in the public sector, but
may not really eliminate undisclosed religion or religious discourse
from the decisionmaking process. 6
The continuum delineating various Establishment Clause views
may be represented as follows:
Promotion of a Nondenominationalism Nonpreference Strict
particular among Separation
religion Religions,
Conscience,
Religion /
Nonreligion
The views representing government promotion of religion -
promotion of a particular religion or nondenominational Christian,
Judaeo-Christian, or Jerusalem-based religions - can be catego-
rized as forms of government endorsement or sponsorship of reli-
gion. Each of those views provides for one form or another of
government sponsorship or endorsement of religion or religious
activity.
Nonpreference as to religion and conscience views may be
categorized as being more accommodating in nature, in that they
permit the government to accommodate religion or conscience so
long as it does so without preferring one religion or matter of
conscience over another. While the nonpreference as to religion and
14. See id. at 496-99 (defining strict separation).
15. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular': Reconstructing the Dis-
establishment Decision, 67 Tx. L. REV. 955, 990-99 (1989) (stating that a secular inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause conflicts with several constitutional freedoms); see
generally Frederick M. Gedicks, Some Political Implications of Religious Beliefs, 4 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 419 (1990) (discussing the implications of a secular
interpretation of the Establishment Clause).
16. See generally PERRY, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing "the proper relation of morali-
ty to politics in a morally pluralistic society.").
[Vol. 43:917
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nonreligion view is accommodationist in nature, it may also be
referred to as neutral. Finally, the strict separationist view is
exclusionary as it excludes religion entirely from the public sector.
A short example may help clarify the nature of each of these
categories, stretching from endorsement to exclusion. In my capaci-
ty as Dean, I recently received a call from a student. He com-
plained that our law school is Christian (we are affiliated with the
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America), yet we fail to place
religious symbols within our facility. He added that he was particu-
larly concerned that we did not have any Christian symbols, other
than a Christmas tree, up in our building over the winter holidays.
The caller closed by noting that, while Christian symbols were
conspicuously (this is his word) absent in our facility, symbols
reflecting Judaism were not - making reference to the Menorah
placed in our building by the Jewish Students Association. I re-
sponded that we would permit Christian symbols to be placed
throughout the building on terms similar to those applied in permit-
ting the placement of other religious symbols, but I added that the
administration did not feel that it was responsible for placing such
symbols in the building. It is clear that the student wanted the ad-
ministration to place its imprimatur on the placement of Christian
religious symbols throughout the building. Not surprisingly, per-
haps, I countered with an accommodationist position, inviting
Christian students to place their symbols throughout the facility on
terms similar to those followed by other student groups. In turn,
the breadth of the groups permitted to place symbols throughout
the building would indicate whether we were taking an
accommodationist or neutral view. Finally, had I advocated the
removal of all religious symbols from the building, I would have
supported the strict separationist or exclusionary position.
A parallel continuum, stretching from endorsement and spon-
sorship to exclusion, helps to clarify further the role that the vari-
ous categories set forth in the prior continuum assume:
Sponsorship I Accommodation Exclusion
Promotion
A third and parallel conceptualization will help clarify matters
further. This conceptualization tracks the prior continuum and fo-
cuses on the issue of coercion. Beginning at the endorsement or
sponsorship end of the continuum, the incidence of government
19931
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coercion is high. For example, if government sponsors or endorses
a particular religion, those not belonging to the sponsored sect will
be coerced. When a particular religion or group of religions receive
preferential treatment from the government, other religionists and
nonreligionists are deprived of a benefit and may be coerced into
allegiance to the sponsored religion in order to receive the benefit.
The incidence of coercion at this point on the continuum is further
exacerbated in the event of the use of sanctions (as opposed to the
conferral of a benefit) against nonreligionists and religionists be-
longing to a nonsponsored sect. Obviously, the broader the class
being preferred or sponsored and the greater the tolerance exer-
cised, the less coercion that would necessarily be present.
Coercion would arguably be lessened in the area of the con-
tinuum representing the accommodationist positions, particularly at
the points on the continuum that represent nonpreference as to
matters of conscience and nonpreference between religion and
nonreligion. The incidence of coercion would be somewhat higher
at the nonpreference as to religion point of the continuum, because
other matters of conscience and nonreligious views would not
receive the same benefits as religious matters and sanctions might
be imposed on strongly held nonreligious views that would be
exempted or otherwise protected if they were religious in nature.
The incidence of coercion as to matters of religion at the
nonpreference point of the continuum would be further exacerbated
by difficulties of definition that might exclude some Eastern and
other forms of religion from the protected class.
The strict separationist position on the continuum would also
be more coercive than the nonpreference as to matters of con-
science and neutrality (nonpreference between religion and
nonreligion) positions. While the strict separationist position would
not be coercive as to nonreligious views, it would be coercive as
to religious and related views, because such views would not be
afforded the same benefits as nonreligious views and sanctions
might be imposed on religious and related views that would not be
equally applicable to nonreligious views. Thus, coercion is poten-
tially greatest at the two extremes and is likely to be lessened at
the accommodationist center.
This conceptualization representing the incidence of coercion
may be helpful, but it raises far more problems than the conceptu-
alizations noted on the preceding continuums. Coercion is itself an
[Vol. 43:917
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elusive concept." It is elusive, because in some sense nearly all
law coerces. By its nature, law often coerces in that it either pro-
vides a benefit to or imposes a sanction on some designated class
or category. Those sanctioned or those who are not permitted to
receive the benefit provided under some legal framework are co-
erced in some measure. Furthermore, it is not possible to make a
distinction for the purposes of coercion analysis between religious-
based and nonreligious-based coercion (i.e., it is not possible to
draw a clear distinction between secular and non-secular purposes).
In this regard, Professor Michael Perry has noted that:
It is virtually never the case that coercive legislation is
grounded, or need be grounded, on (or solely on) such a
[non-secular] reason. Coercive legislation is virtually always
based (in part, at least) on a belief that the prohibited way
of acting or living involves either physical or psychological
harm (or both), whether to persons who live or act the
prohibited way, to other persons or entities, or to both.
That is, coercive legislation, like legislation generally, vir-
tually always has an "earthly" or "worldly" or, to use the
Supreme Court's word, "secular" purpose: a purpose (goal,
objective) intelligible or comprehensible in earthly terms as
distinct from solely "heavenly" or "otherworldly" or "spiri-
tual" terms. Basil Mitchell's observation is relevant here:
"Christians [for example] would presumably want to ar-
gue... that the Christian revelation does not require us to
interpret the nature of man in ways for which there is
otherwise no warrant but rather affords us a deeper under-
standing of man as he essentially is." 8
These two difficulties - nearly all law coerces and coercion can-
not be conclusively grounded on a distinction between religious
and secular purposes - inhere in any coercion-based Establishment
Clause analysis. Furthermore, as discussed subsequently, coercion is
at best a predicate in search of a subject - coercion must be
defined in light of what is being coerced.19 Nevertheless, it does
17. See infra part iI.B (discussing the difficulties in a coercion-based analysis).
18. PERRY, supra note 7, at 115 (citations omitted).
19. See infra part 1.B. It might be argued, however, that the problem of proving a
coercive purpose might be cured by examining the intent of the lawmakers. If the law-
makers intended to benefit or burden a specific act of conscience, that intention would
render the legislative act in question invalid. Determining the intent or motive of a legis-
lative body can be quite elusive and often not satisfactory. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
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appear evident that the incidence of coercion (as to religion and
nonreligion) is minimized near the accommodationist middle of the
first continuum.
Before turning to the recent Establishment Clause cases to be
discussed in this article, a final distinction needs to be drawn. This
distinction is based on the theory of interpretation used by the
Court in deciding such cases. I have previously argued, with some
dismay, that the Court appears to be engaged in judicial review
that is more concerned with deferring to the majoritarian branches
of government than it is with protecting the liberty of con-
science.20 The Establishment Clause cases must be read with this
caveat in mind: the Court may be less concerned with the liberty
of conscience than with merely creating a doctrine that permits
them to defer to legislative determinations in virtually all areas,
including the legislation related to matters of religion and con-
science.
Im. TBE MOVEMENT TOWARD A CONSCIENCE-BASED ESTABLISH-
MENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Members of the Court referred to the right of, or an
individual's interest in, conscience in a number of early cases.21
Recently, however, the discussion of conscience in major Establish-
ment Clause cases has accelerated and now seems to dominate. In
Texas Monthly v. BullockF and Lee v. Weisman,' two signifi-
cant recent cases in the Establishment Clause area, the use of con-
science has essentially displaced the use of religion as the term of
choice for the Court in explicating its doctrinal analysis. An exami-
nation of this phenomenon in each of these cases is in order.
A. Texas Monthly
In Texas Monthly, the Court held that a sales tax exemption for
"[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith
613, 645-47 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that searching for a legislative motive
to discriminate will under-protect minorities).
20. Cf. Smith, Liberty, supra note 2, at 465 (stating that the deferentialist view pre-
dominates). Compare William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX.
L. REV. 693, 699 (1976) (stating that deference is the Court's best policy).
21. See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 53 (1985); Welch v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
22. 489 U.S. 1 (1991).
23. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
926 [V/ol. 43:917
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and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of
the faith and books that consist wholly of writings sacred to a
religious faith,"' violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment because Texas denied a like exemption for certain
other nonreligious publications.'
In Texas Monthly, there were four opinions written: a plurality
opinion written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Marshall
and Stevens, a concurring opinion by Justice White, a concurrence
by Justice Blackmun which was joined by Justice O'Connor, and a
dissent written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. 6
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, wrote
the plurality opinion and concluded that:
If the State chose to subsidize, by means of a tax exemp-
tion, all groups that contributed, to the community's cultur-
al, intellectual, and moral betterment, then the exemption
for religious publications could be retained, provided that
the exemption swept as widely as the property tax exemp-
tion we upheld in Walz. By contrast, if Texas sought to
promote reflection and discussion about questions of ulti-
mate value and the contours of a good or meaningful life,
then a tax exemption would have to be available to an ex-
tended range of associations whose publications were sub-
stantially devoted to such matters; the exemption could not
be reserved for publications dealing solely with religious
issues, let alone restricted to publications advocating rather
than criticizing religious belief or activity, without signaling
an endorsement of religion that is offensive to the princi-
ples informing the Establishment Clause."
24. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5 (alteration in original) (citing TEx. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.312 (West 1982) (amended 1989)).
25. Id. at 15. See also Smith, Response, supra note 2, at 263-69 (discussing Texas
Monthly).
26. It might be argued that, since Justice Marshall has been replaced by Justice Thom-
as and Justice Brennan has been replaced by Justice Souter, the majority in Texas Month-
ly may be fragile, given that Justice Souter joined in Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Weisman, which tracks the -conscience" analysis in Texas Monthly.
27. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15-16 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan refers to en-
dorsement, as opposed to noncoercion, as the government action being questioned. Since
this article focuses on the reasons for protecting conscience, the distinction between the
endorsement test articulated initially by Justice O'Connor and referred to by Justice
Brennan in Texas Monthly and noncoercion as articulated by Justice Kennedy in Weisman,
is not pertinent. However, for a strong critique of the endorsement test, as formulated by
19931
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While it is clear that Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens reject-
ed the view that government may offer financial aid, in the form
of a tax exemption, to religious groups alone, it is equally clear
that such an exemption might be extended to religious groups so
long as they were a part of a larger class.
In this regard, Justice Brennan suggests that a sales tax exemp-
tion statute could include religious groups and pass constitutional
muster if the exemption included "an extended range of associa-
tions whose publications were substantially devoted to" the accom-
modation of reflection and discussion about questions of ultimate
value or the contours of a meaningful life. 8 While one might
well quibble with Justice Brennan's broadening of the class neces-
sary to permit the exemption, his willingness to allow Texas to
accommodate reflection about questions of "ultimate value and the
contours of a good or meaningful life,"29 demonstrates a willing-
ness to respect matters of conscience.3"
Justice Brennan has seemed to conflate nonpreferential accom-
modation between religion and nonreligion (a very broad category)
and nonpreferential accommodation of matters of conscience.31
Accommodation based on nonpreference between religion and
nonreligion would largely render such legislative distinctions mean-
ingless, because the category of religion and nonreligion includes a
universe of possibilities (i.e., all it does is insure that religion or
conscience need not be discriminated against in a general statutory
scheme providing for an exemption).32 Such an exemption would
be little or no exemption at all, because the class exempted would
be so large that it would merely confirm that a very broad class of
material (e.g., in Texas Monthly, literature) would not be taxed.
This, however, does not appear to be the thrust of Justice
Brennan's opinion. Rather, he seems to focus on a conscience-
Justice O'Connor, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 266, 300-01
(1987) (questioning the ambiguity and indeterminancy of the test). I would assert that
both the endorsement and the noncoercion tests are necessarily indeterminate, unless the
term they apply to, conscience or religion, is clarified. See infra notes 50-54 and accom-
panying text.
28. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 16.
29. Id.
30. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 687-89 (1967) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the reasons for granting tax exemptions to religious organizations).
31. Smith, Response, supra note 2, at 265.
32. Smith, Liberty, supra note 2, at 507.
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based class for accommodation purposes.
Justice White's concurring opinion was based on the Free
Speech Clause and offered little insight regarding the issue of
whether the Court focuses on conscience in Establishment Clause
analysis.33 He did join the majority in Walz v. Tax Commission
and apparently would favor accommodation of religious groups on
the basis of a broader definition that encompassed conscience, and
not just religion. Whether he would permit a more restrictive class
or category than that accommodated in Walz remains unclear, how-
ever.
Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion. Justice Blackmun's opinion was critical because without
the votes of Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, the Texas statute,
with its emphasis on the more restrictive category of religion, as
opposed to the broader category of conscience, would have been
upheld against the Establishment Clause claim. In his opinion, Jus-
tice Blackmun stated:
It is possible for a State to write a tax-exemption statute
consistent with both values [free exercise and establish-
ment]: for example, a state statute might exempt the sale
not only of religious literature distributed by a religious
organization but also of philosophical literature distributed
by non-religious organizations devoted to such matters of
conscience as life and death, good and evil, being and
nonbeing, right and wrong.35
Thus, for Justices Blacknun and O'Connor, had Texas drafted their
exemption to include "matters of conscience," it would have sur-
vived the Establishment Clause challenge.
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, together with Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the dissenters in Texas Monthly, disagreed and would
have upheld the statute as drafted. Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia
33. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 26 (1988) (White, J., concurring).
34. 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1967).
35. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J. concurring). However, at the
conclusion of his opinion, Justice Blackrnun enigmatically stated that had the statute in-
cluded atheistic literature, it "might survive Establishment Clause scrutiny." Id. at 29. A
tax exemption statute that exempted religious, including atheistic, literature would not
necessarily extend to all matters of conscience. It is unclear, therefore, how broad the
exemption would have to be drawn to satisfy Justices Blackmun and O'Connor. It is very
clear, however, that a statute protecting or accommodating matters of conscience would
survive an Establishment Clause challenge.
1993]
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drew a distinction between direct subsidies to religion, which were
disfavored because they divert income from believers and nonbe-
lievers alike, and exemptions for religion generally, which were
permitted because "the state merely refrains from diverting to its
own uses income independently generated by the churches through
voluntary contributions."36 Scalia, Kennedy and Rehnquist, there-
fore, would protect exemptions for religion, and would not require
expansion of the exempted class to the broader category of con-
science.
It appears, however, that all of the Justices in Texas Monthly
would uphold an exemption for or accommodation of matters of
conscience against an Establishment Clause challenge, provided that
definition was drawn broadly enough. An exemption based on
religion alone, however, would be subject to being invalidated on
Establishment Clause grounds.37
B. Lee v. Weisman38
In a five to four decision, the Court in Weisman held that
including a cleric who offers prayers as part of an official public
school graduation violates the religion provision of the First
Amendment. Four opinions were written: Justice Kennedy's opinion
for the Court (joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and
Souter); Justice Blackmun's concurrence (joined by Justices Stevens
and O'Connor); Justice Souter's concurrence (joined by Justices
Stevens and O'Connor); and Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion
(joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thom-
as). An examination of these opinions will again demonstrate that
the Court permits government to accommodate, and perhaps may
even be inclined to protect, matters of conscience.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy stressed that
"there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of con-
science from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and sec-
ondary public schools."39 He noted, as well, that: "One timeless
36. Id. at 43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 553 (1968)). Justice
Scalia's distinction between income and subsidies is a bit strained, because the sales tax
lost due to the exemption would merely increase tax burdens elsewhere, thereby requiring
that the nonbeliever make up some of the lost revenue. See Smith, Response, supra note
2, at 267 (stating that Justice Scalia's distinction has carried weight with the Court).
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
39. Id. at 2658. It is unclear whether such "subtle coercive pressure[s]" arise in other
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lesson [of the First Amendment] is that if citizens are subjected to
state-sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows its own duty
to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief
which is the mark of a free people."' In rejecting the
Government's argument in support of the graduation prayer prac-
tice, Justice Kennedy specifically noted that it gave "insufficient
recognition to the real conflict of conscience faced by the young
student." 41
The majority invoked the Establishment Clause to protect the
freedom of conscience from coercion. Justice Kennedy did limit the
Court's opinion, in this regard, however, by noting that:
We do not hold that every state action implicating
religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive.
People may take offense at all manner of religious as well
as nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not in
every case show a violation. We know too that sometimes
to endure social isolation or even anger may be the price
of conscience or nonconformity. But, by any reading of our
cases, the conformity required of the student in this case
was too high an exaction to withstand the test of the Es-
tablishment Clause.42
The Court's qualification of the extent to which it would protect
the freedom of conscience from coercion in other cases under the
aegis of the Establishment Clause, reveals a certain uneasiness on
the part of the potentially weak, five-person majority in Weisman.
Some of this uneasiness evidenced by Justice Kennedy's equivoca-
tion might have been allayed had he distinguished between cultural
and governmental coercion of conscience. Cultural coercion of
conscience is typically coercion of a private sort and may be per-
missible, even though it may exact a significant price in terms of
41its implications for the unfettered development of conscience.
contexts.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 2660.
42. Id. at 2661. This would seem to leave intact cases that permit religious exercises
in other contexts. See, e.g., Lynch. v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (permitting a
city to erect a Christmas display, including a cr6ehe); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
795 (1983) (permitting a prayer at the beginning of a state's legislative session). Further-
more, since the coercion in Weisman was merely "subtle," it is hard to anticipate what
cases might pass muster in the future. For example, the singing of Christmas carols in a
public school might be upheld despite an Establishment Clause challenge, although the
Court's equivocation does little more than leave open this possibility.
43. The law distinguishes between cultural and governmental coercion, but either form
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The majority culture" often imposes a significant price for the
person whose conscience causes her to run counter to that culture.
While this cost may be mitigated statutorily, it is pervasive. When,
however, cultural coercion is supplemented or endorsed by public
action, it becomes almost overwhelming, carrying the imprimatur of
the state, and indicating to the individual whose conscience is
tested, that her conscience is devalued by the government. For a
democratic organ of government to act in such a manner devalues
the participation of one of its members and demands a level of
homogeneity that demeans the democratic process.45 Had Justice
Kennedy recognized this distinction between government action and
private cultural coercion, it might have helped clarify his qualifica-
tion of the extent to which the right of conscience is protected by
the First Amendment. It may have added support for the need to
protect against government coercion of conscience, as well. Even
without articulating this distinction, however, it is clear that Justice
Kennedy, and the four Justices joining with him in Weisman, view
the Establishment Clause as providing significant limitations on
governmental coercion of conscience.
In his concurrence, which was joined by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the Court's "[c]ases
have prohibited government endorsement of religion, its sponsor-
ship, and active involvement in religion, whether or not citizens
were coerced.,4 6 Justice Blackrnun would opt for an endorsement
test,47 but he is equally concerned with protecting conscience in
of coercion can have a dramatic influence on the develpment of an individual's con-
science. But see Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea
of Property, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1319, 1334-37 (1987) (arguing that there should be no
distinction between public and private coercion). Nevertheless, this distinction persists,
although it is cured in some measure by statutory limits on private coercion which pro-
hibit discrimination on religious or related grounds.
44. I use the term "majority culture" loosely, recognizing that there may well be no
single majority culture. Nevertheless, significant and often complementary cultures may
aggregate into a majority culture. An apt example of this phenomenon is the cultural
force of nondenominational Christianity in our society - it is made up of many sects but
those sects aggregate such that they manifest themselves culturally in a single Christian-
majority culture.
45. This point needs further elaboration. However, since it constitutes an aside -
though an aside of some importance - I will leave that explication for another day.
46. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2667 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47. Justice O'Connor devised the endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984). Rather than focusing on coercion, O'Connor focused on endorsement. Id. at 692
("What is crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating a
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion."). The endorsement test,
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Establishment Clause analysis. In this regard, he acknowledges that:
"There is no doubt that attempts to aid religion through govern-
ment coercion jeopardize freedom of conscience[, and e]ven subtle
pressure diminishes the right of each individual to choose volun-
tarily what to believe."48 He adds that any time government "puts
its imprimatur on a particular religion, it conveys a message of
exclusion to all those who do not adhere to the favored beliefs."49
Therfore, use of the endorsement test does not diminish the em-
phasis on conscience (as opjosed to the term religion) in the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Justice Souter, who is joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor
(but not Blackmun), clarifies this point. Referring to the Texas.
Monthly decision, Justice Souter rejects the "'nonpreferential' state
promotion of religion," whether or not there is proof of coercion in
the record," but he repeatedly emphasizes that this conclusion is
based on the freedom of conscience of believer and nonbeliever
alike.51 Thus, while Justice Souter seems to opt for the view that
government may not distinguish between believers and nonbelievers
(nonpreference between religion and nonreligion),52 he otherwise
focuses on conscience, as being the applicable term for Establish-
ment Clause purposes.
The dissenting Justices, on the other hand, supported the prayer
practice in Weisman, arguing that it did not constitute actual gov-
however, has been criticized as not providing any more definite solutions to the confusion
of the Establishment Clause. See Smith, supra note 27, at 267 ("Far from eliminating the
inconsistencies and defects that have plagued establishment analysis, the 'no endorsement'
test would introduce further ambiguities and analytical deficiencies into the doctrine.").
Indeed, both the coercion and the endorsement tests are arguably empty, without a viable
definition of conscience and without reference to the subject being coerced or endorsed.
Both the endorsement and the coercion tests are predicates in search of a subject. The
subject must be elucidated for them to have meaning. Thus, the Justices' quibbling over
endorsement and coercion, without defining the subject - conscience or some other cate-
gory arguably being coerced or endorsed - is largely a meaningless endeavor.
48. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2665.
49. Id. (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 2667.
51. Id.
52. As previously noted, this nonpreferentialism between religion and nonreligion is
essentially devoid of meaning. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. It may be, in
fact, that Justice Souter merely fails to distinguish among the three versions of
nonpreferentialism: nonpreference between religion and nonreligion, nonpreference as to
matters of conscience, and nonpreference among religions. Indeed, given that he cited
Texas Monthly with approval, it is likely that he has simply failed to appreciate the dis-
tinction between nonpreference as to matters of conscience and nonpreference among reli-
gions.
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eminent coercion. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Scalia conclud-
ed that:
Needless to say, no one should be compelled [to participate
in the prayer], but it is a shame to deprive our public
culture of the opportunity, and indeed the encouragement,
for people to do it voluntarily .... To deprive our society
of that important unifying mechanism, in order to spare the
nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience
of standing or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation, is
as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law.5 3
Justice Scalia obviously sees little harm in government "encourage-
ment" for a "public culture" that is religiously based. Thus, not
only does he refuse to distinguish between private culture and
public encouragement of that culture that may psychologically
infringe (he prefers the term "offend") on one's conscience, he also
would permit government to use the undeniable force of majority
culture to unify society.
Justice Scalia focuses largely on perceived deficiencies in the
majority's invocation of a "psychological coercion" test,54 in in-
validating the graduation prayer. He writes little about the right of
conscience, preferring no doubt, as evidenced by his opinion in
Texas Monthly, to use the more restrictive term religion, and to use
religion to unify society, even if psychological coercion might
result.5
Despite a solid contingent of dissenters in both cases, Weisman
and Texas Monthly demonstrate that the Court is willing to permit
53. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2686 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
54. Id. at 2679.
55. Justice Scalia makes light of the use of "psychological coercion," id., at one point
asserting that the majority engaged in a "psycho-journey" beyond the competence of the
Court. Id. at 2684. It should be noted, however, that courts engage in "psycho-jourmey[s]"
in many areas (e.g., insanity and competency determinations) and have done so for a long
time. His concern, therefore, must be with using the device in the area of conscience or
religion. One is left on such a basis to wonder whether a party could marshal any proof
of coercion sufficient to demonstrate an infringement on conscience, despite Justice
Scalia's assertion that "maintaining respect for the religious observances of others is a
fundamental civic virtue that government (including the public schools) can and should
cultivate." Id. at 2682. Indeed, particularly when his opinion in Weisman is read in con-
junction with his opinion for the Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (prohibiting the use of peyote for religious purposes), it appears that Justice Scalia
balances civic needs over matters of conscience in virtually all instances. Additionally,
Justice Scalia's refqsal to look to psychology and theology in making Frst Amendment
determinations deprives religion and conscience of much of its essence.
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government accommodation of conscience under the aegis of the
Establishment Clause. In Employment Division v. Smith,56 the
Court refused to recognize the right of members of the Native
American Church to use peyote as a sacrament, when that use
violated state drug laws. This indicates an unwillingness on the
part of the Court to permit exemptions from general laws in order
to further the free exercise of religion. Nevertheless, the Court is
willing to focus on the notion of conscience in Establishment
Clause cases and often refers to that notion as a right. Unfortunate-
ly, however, the Court has been distracted by disagreements over
coercion and endorsement,57 and has ignored the need to pursue
questions raised by the use of conscience - the term of preference
for the majority in Establishment Clause analysis. In the remainder
of the article, I focus on definitional and philosophical issues re-
lated to conscience. These must be addressed regardless of whether
or not the Court chooses to use an endorsement or a coercion test
as a predicate to the term of choice, conscience.
IV. CONSCIENCE IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED
With his opinion for the Court in Weisman, Justice Kennedy
has articulated a coercion as to matters of conscience test that
needs further explication. This raises a number of difficult prob-
lems which must be addressed, regarding both conscience and
coercion. In this section of this article, I delineate some of those
problems, looking first at definitional and related problems that
must be confronted in explicating a conscience-based theory or
doctrine, and then examining problems that arise related to devel-
opment of the concept of coercion. While not necessarily exhaus-
tive, these problems demonstrate that a conscience-based doctrine
is, at best, in its formative stage as a theoretical basis for Estab-
lishment Clause analysis.
A. Problems Related to "Conscience"
A number of definitional and related problems will have to be
56. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
57. Since Justice Kennedy's vote is the critical fifth vote (the swing vote), the coercion
test is likely to prevail, particularly if it can be concluded that it is more permissive than
the endorsement test in allowing government to accommodate. It is likely, for example,
that Justice Kennedy will join the dissenters in a case that would violate the endorsement
test but did not violate his coercion test. The coercion test, therefore, controls.
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dealt with in the development of a conscience-based theory of the
Establishment Clause.
1. "Conscience": The Definitional Challenge
In the words of one author, "the courts have avoided the quag-
mire of defining religion,"58 for the purposes of First Amendment
analysis. While this is an overstatement, in that there have been
some admirable judicial efforts to give definition to "religion" for
the purposes, of First Amendment analysis, 9 the Supreme Court
has largely avoided this definitional issue.6° Commentators have
been even more willing to try their hands at comprehensive defini-
tions, or definitional frameworks,61 although they have enjoyed
little success in having their ideas embodied in caselaw.
Similar definitional efforts relative to conscience as a conceptu-
al basis for First Amendment purposes appear to be underway. As
previously noted, in the Texas Monthly case, two variants of a
definition of an accommodationist doctrine based on conscience
were proffered. The view of Justice Brennan would protect all
groups that contribute to cultural, intellectual and moral betterment
or that promote reflection and discussion about questions of ulti-
mate value and the contours of a good and meaningful life. The
view of Justice Blackmun would accommodate such matters of
conscience as life and death, good and evil, right and wrong.62
Undoubtedly, problems of the sort that have plagued efforts to de-
fine religion will pose a challenge for those seeking to define
conscience.
a. The Problem of Transcendence and Immanence
Professor Tribe notes that the Supreme Court initially defined
58. Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 CUMB.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1991).
59. See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 201 (3d. Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concur-
ring) ("[T]he traditional definition [of religion] was grounded upon a Theistic perception
of religion.").
60. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) and United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (broadly defining religion in a statutory context); School
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (finding that an activity may be religious even though not derived from a
societally recognized religious sect).
61. See, e.g., m. elisabeth bergeron, Note, "New Age" or New Testament?: Toward a
More Faithful Interpretation of 'Religion," 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 365 (1991) (analyzing
efforts by courts and scholars to define religion).
62. See supra notes 26, 30 and accompanying text.
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religion restrictively, but that with increased religious pluralism, it
has wrestled to articulate a more expansive definition. 3 Tribe also
asserts that "for many [theologians] there has been a shift in reli-
gious thought from a theocentric, transcendental perspective to
forms of religious consciousness that stress the immanence of
meaning in the natural order."' Rising pluralism and changes in
theological outlook, together with the very complexity and
politicization of law itself, have combined to make the definitional
task all the more daunting." '
Defining conscience presents similar difficulties. One theologian
has noted that, "So striking is the lack of consensus on the mean-
ing of 'conscience,' . . . that one might seriously question its use-
fulness in ethical reflection. And yet 'conscience' will not go
away." 66 Professor Conn, however, goes on to assert that develop-
mental and philosophical understanding of "conscience as self-tran-
scending subjectivity involv[ing] radical personal conversion as a
normative criterion of authenticity, "67 is possible. Like law, theol-
ogy is having to bridge the transcendent, in all its abstraction, with
the immanent, more subjective, aspects of conscience.
Analytic philosophy, with its emphasis on abstract concepts and
conceptions, which are typically transcendent, will no doubt be
helpful in developing a viable definition of conscience, but it can-
not complete the definitional venture.68 Professor Michael Perry
has demonstrated the limits of a noncoherentist view of the rational
63. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITuTnONAL LAw 1179-88 (2d ed. 1988).
64. Id. at 1180.
65. Drawing on the work of Professor Walzer, Professor Michelman has noted the
"cosmic but local" nature of the law, placed as it is between philosophy and politics. See
Michelman, supra note 43, at 1321-24. He also argues that the separation of legal con-
ceptions of property, in a transcendent or abstract sense', from politics is inappropriate.
Like property conceptions, theological or philosophical conceptions of religion or con-
science are "cosmic but local," and defy the legal penchant for clear-cut, abstract defini-
tion.
66. WALTER E. CONN, CONSCIENCE: DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-TRANSCENDENCE 1
(1981).
67. Id. at 2.
68. In the non-legal context, Lewis Thomas has said:
[ilt is illusion to think that there is anything fragile about the life of the
earth; surely this is the toughest membrane imaginable in the universe, opaque
to probability, impermeable to death. We are the delicate part, transient and
vulnerable as cilia. Nor is it a new thing for man to be above the rest of life;
this has been his most consistent intellectual exertion down the millennia. As
illusion, it has never worked out to his satisfaction in the past, any more than
it does today. Man is embedded in nature.
LEWIS THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL 1 (1974).
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enterprise in his book Love and Power.9 While Perry does not
direct his comments to the specific definitional enterprise being
discussed in this section, his points are applicable. Perry sets the
stage by quoting Richard Rorty:
[A]t times like that of Auschwitz, when history is in up-
heaval and traditional institutions and patterns of behavior
are collapsing, we want something which stands beyond
history and institutions .... I have been urging ... that
we try not to want something which stands beyond history
and institutions .... [A] belief can still regulate action,
can still be thought worth dying for, among people who
are quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper
than contingent historical circumstance.7"
Such realism, with its regard for the subjective and immanent,
however, does not adequately address the call of religion or con-
science. In making this point, Perry quotes Professor Jackson for
the observation that: "The pull toward religious faith is at best a
residue of metaphysical realism and of the craving for metaphysical
comfort. The taste for the transcendent usually associated with a
religious personality will find little place in a Rortian world."71
Rorty's world recognizes the immanent, but fails to give much
room for the transcendent, and therefore offers little solace for the
conscience, with its transcendent aspects.
Conscience is at once transcendent, drawing as it does on ab-
stract conceptions (commandments, doctrines, covenants, etc.), and
immanent, relating as it does to the subjective position of the actor.
For example, questions of sincerity often arise in the context of
conscience. 2 To question the sincerity of one's act of conscience
is to acknowledge its immanence, while to recognize one's
adherence to principles or doctrines acknowledges its transcendence.
In a more epistemological sense, as Perry argues, a coherentist
conception of rationality acknowledges subjectivity and immanence:
Just as materials and purposes constrain our toolmak-
69. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 52-65.
70. IdM at 62-63 (quoting RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 189
(1989)).
71. Id. at 63 (quoting Timothy Jackson, The Theory and Practice of Discomfort: Rich-
ard Rorty and Pragmatism, 51 Thomist 270, 279 (1987)).
72. E.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (raising the issue of sincerity in
the religious context).
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ing, the world ("as it is whatever we think about it"), in
conjunction both with our interests (including our "human"
interests: the interests we human beings have in common
with each other as members of the same species) and with
our projects (especially our communal projects, for exam-
ple, space exploration), is a constraint on our theory-mak-
ing and language-making. The coherentist conception of
rationality neither entails nor presupposes to the contrary.
Hilary Putnam, whose views on the rationality (which are
coherentist) and on truth (which are internalist), . . . has
written that "my view is not a view in which the mind
makes up the world .... If one must use metaphorical
language, then let the metaphor be this: the mind and the
world jointly make up the mind and the world."73
As Perry notes, a coherentist view of rationality accounts for the
interplay of the immanent and the transcendent.7' In such a world,
the effort to define conscience may be trying but it is not doomed
to fail. While a definition must account for the interplay between
the transcendent and immanent aspects of conscience, this interplay
does not itself doom the definitional enterprise. Indeed, to be re-
flective of conscience in all its aspects, a definition would have to
take into account both the transcendent and the immanent dimen-
sions of conscience.
b. The Nature of the Freedom of Conscience
We must examine the nature of conscience from two perspec-
tives: (1) its substantive content; and (2) whether it is a right or
something else. In this section, I will deal with the latter issue, and
will deal with the former point in the following section.
As developed to date by the Court, it is unclear whether con-
science in Establishment Clause analysis functions as a right or
simply as a privilege to receive certain benefits or to be exempted
from certain obligations under an accommodationist rationale. If the
exemptions and benefits provided are rights, they are very weak
rights, in the sense that they run more to government than to the
individual or the group. The only sense in which an individual or
73. PERRY, supra note 7, at 59 (footnotes omitted) (quoting HILARY PUTNAM, TRUTH
AND HISTORY xi (1981)).
74. A debate over the appropriate view of rationality is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. I defer, therefore, to the points made by Professor Perry, finding them to be quite
congenial to my own and adequate to the purposes of this article. See id. ch. 4.
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group may be said to have a right is the extent to which govern-
ment must accommodate equally or nonpreferentially when it de-
cides to accommodate. Thus, it might be said that government is
the right-holder - government may accommodate, but is not re-
quired to do so, and is only limited (required to act equally or
nonpreferentially) when it chooses to accommodate - and the
private individual or group is dependent on the largess of the gov-
ernment in permitting them to exercise that right.
The only remaining sense in which it might be said that a right
is being created with the use of conscience in the Establishment
Clause context would be to argue that citizens opposed to any
form of establishment are being protected against governmental
accommodations of religion, except in those instances when the
accommodation is nonpreferential as to matters of conscience. This,
of course, would not constitute a right of conscience. Rather, it
would be a right to be free from government support of religion,
except under limited circumstances.
If, however, conscience is utilized in the free exercise as well
as the establishment context, it would be more accurate to say that
it is a right of an individual or a group, in that it is a right that is
a direct limitation upon government action (i.e., it is a side-con-
straint, constraining government from acting in certain ways).
Since, however, the Court has not recognized conscience in the
free exercise context, other than in the limited statutory case of
conscientious objectors, at this time it would be inaccurate to say
that the Court has recognized a right of conscience in any signifi-
cant sense.75
c. The Substantive Content or Nature of Conscience
Professor Sandel has recently articulated two distinct theoretical
bases for a right of conscience: a choice-based right and an obliga-
tion-based right. In describing the predominant justification for a
75. Given the Court's reluctance to broaden the right of free exercise from religion to
conscience, such a move would have to be legislative, as was the case in the conscien-
tious objector context. In considering the Religious Restoration Act (an act designed to
overrule the doctrine set forth in the Smith case), Congress might do well to consider
broadening the protection from religion to conscience, thereby making the freedom of
conscience a statutory right. By broadening the free exercise right to include matters of
conscience, as well as religion, Congress could do much to help further human rights and
would also be taking a significant step in the direction of creating a unified theory of the
religion provision. Conscience-based theory also might eliminate the historic tension be-
tween the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
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right of conscience in our legal and political thought - a justifica-
tion based on individual choice - Sandel states that:
This version of liberalism [which is premised on the idea
that government should be neutral on the question of the
good life] is defined by the claim that the right is prior to
the good, and in two senses: first, individual rights cannot
be sacrificed for the sake of the general good; and second,
the principles of justice that specify these rights cannot be
premised on any particular vision of the good life. What
justifies the rights is not that they maximize the general
welfare or otherwise promote the good, but rather that they
comprise a fair framework within which individuals can
choose their own values and ends, consistent with a similar
liberty for others.7"
After reviewing a number of Supreme Court cases dealing with
religious liberty, Professor Sandel opines that, "The Court's tenden-
cy to assimilate religious liberty to liberty in general reflects the
aspiration to neutrality; people should be free to pursue their own
interests and ends, whatever they are, consistent with a similar
liberty for others."'
Professor Sandel goes on to refer to this as a "voluntarist"
basis or justification for the right of conscience, arguing as well
that such a version tends to conflate the right of conscience with a
general right to liberty Sandel concludes that the Court's jurispru-
dence in the First Amendment area is largely dominated by this
choice-based or voluntarist justification. He does acknowledge,
however, that, "The Court has on occasion accorded greater respect
to the claims of encumbered selves." 8
Sandel argues further in this regard that "freedom of conscience
and freedom of choice are not the same; where conscience dictates,
choice decides. Where the freedom of conscience is at stake, the
relevant right is to exercise a duty, not make a choice."79 Thus,
Professor Sandel argues against the contemporary liberal view that
"religious liberty serves the broader mission of protecting mdividu-
76. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF
FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUB-
uic PHILOSOPHY 74, 75 (James D. Hunter & Os Gunness eds., 1990).
77. Id. at 91.
78. Id. at 90.
79. Id. at 88.
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al autonomy," 80 by asserting that:
Protecting religion as a "life-style," as one among the val-
ues that an independent self may have, may miss the role
that religion plays in the lives of those for whom the ob-
servance of religious duties is a constitutive end, essential
to their good and indispensable to their identity. Treating
persons as "self-originating sources of valid claims" may
thus fail to respect persons bound by duties derived from
sources other than themselves.81
Sandel, therefore, opts for an obligation-based as opposed to a
choice-based justification for the right of conscience.
Obligation and choice as bases for a right or some other inter-
est in conscience give rise to differing benefits and achieve differ-
mng purposes. A right of conscience based on voluntarism and
choice respects autonomy - the right of an individual to develop
his or her own selffhood or identity. Purposes achieved by a
choice-based theory of conscience emphasize individualism and are
solicitous of choice. A choice-based right of conscience is,
therefore, quite congenial with individual rights theories.82
An obligation-based theory, on the other hand, is more conge-
nial with communitarian notions. Under an obligation-based theory,
the individual is bound to obey certain commandments, covenants
or duties - duties often incumbent on members of the community
of which one is a part. The benefits of an obligation-based theory
of conscience, therefore, are different in nature from those spawned
by a choice-based theory. Obligation based theories emphasize the
benefits of community responsibility while choice-based theories
emphasize the benefits of autonomy. 3
80. Id.
81. Id. at 89.
82. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 1-5 (1974) (arguing that
the importance of personal choice and autonomy rights limits the State's role to protecting
individual liberties). Such a view is also quite congenial with Professor Lamasky's view
that individuals should be protected in their project pursuits. Loren S. Lamasky, Compen-
sation and the Bounds of Rights, in COMPENSATORY JUSTIcE 13 (John W. Chapman ed.,
1991).
83. While his work regarding the notion of obligation does not center on conscience as
a concept, Professor Robert M. Cover wrote a very thoughtful piece regarding obligation
in Jewish jurisprudence. Cover pointed out that:
In a jurisprudence of mitzvoth (obligation) the loaded, evocative edge is at the
assignment of responsibility. It is to the parent paying tuition, the householder
paying his assessment, that the Law speaks eloquently and persuasively. It is
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While Sandel is no doubt correct in distinguishing between the
choice and obligation bases for a right of conscience, given the
differing roles and benefits of each, the bases are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Actions based on conscience are often both
obligation and choice based.
In my religion, for example, I am obligated (expected) to obey
certain commandments (e.g., I am to refrain from drinking alcohol-
ic beverages). If the government were to require that I imbibe, it
would violate my right of conscience. It can be said that my act of
conscience is obligation-based, with an emphasis on duty, as are
virtually all acts of conscience. Thus, and to use another example,
a conscientious objector to war objects on the ground that he or
she is duty-bound (obligated) to preserve life. In that sense, the
conscientious objector's conscience is a matter of obligation, not
simply a matter of choice.'
for him/her that the myth resonates. This is true for all welfare functions and
for ritual ones as well.
Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & REui-
GION 65, 72 (1988).
Cover acknowledges, however, that:
If there is a comparative rhetorical advantage to mitzvoth (obligation) in the
realm of communal entitlements, there is, it seems to me, a corresponding
comparative rhetorical advantage to rights (autonomy) in the area of political
participation. The myth of social contract is a myth of co-equal autonomous,
voluntary acts .... However, in a jurisprudence of mitzvoth one must first
create an argument for equality of obligation and only as a result of that come
to equality of participation. The fact is that there might be important reasons
which justify distinctions in obligations (e.g., the capacity to bear children)
which nonetheless do not in any straightforward way mitigate against complete
equality of participation. The rights rhetoric goes to the nub of this matter
because it is keyed to the projection of personality among indifferent or hostile
others. The reality of such indifference, hostility or oppression is what the
rhetoric of responsibility obscures. At its best it obscures it by, in fact, remov-
ing or mitigating the causes. At its worst it is the ideological mask of familiar
oppressions.
Id. at 73.
84. On this point, Cover stresses:
When I am asked to reflect upon Judaism and human rights, therefore, the first
thought that comes to mind is that the categories are wrong. I do not mean, of
course, that basic ideas of human dignity and worth are not powerfully ex-
pressed in the Jewish legal and literary traditions. Rather, I mean that because
it is a legal tradition Judaism has its own categories for expressing through law
the worth and dignity of each human being. And the categories are not closely
analogous to "human rights." The principal word in Jewish law, which occupies
a place equivalent in evocative force to the American legal 'system's "rights," is
the word "mitzvah" which literally means commandment but has a general
meaning closer to "incumbent obligation."
Id. at 65. Cover, no doubt, would be much more reluctant than I am to argue for a
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In another sense, however, my action is a matter of choice. We
choose which commandments or doctrines that we will follow as a
matter of conscience (i.e., I can choose to deny my conscience or
the conscience of my community as they relate to a particular
doctrine). In some sense, I also chose my religion or conscience as
a matter of association. However, my relationship with religion
might be better characterized as a dynamic one: In some senses I
choose my religion (I voluntarily choose to be bound to its doc-
trine when I become a part of the sect or group or reconfirm my
membership by each new act of fidelity to a commandment or
more of the group), while in other senses it binds my choice (hav-
ing chosen my religion, I am bound by its doctrine if I am to be
faithful). This dynamic is complicated further by the fact that my
religion may act as culture, subtly coercing my choices. For exam-
ple, having been born into my faith, which I share with my wife,
my children feel the tug of our religious culture, calling on them
to conform. While we, as their parents, want them to choose our
religion, we fully recognize that they are influenced daily by our
family and church activities to adhere to the doctrine and obey the
commandments (i.e., in some sense their capacity for choice is
constrained by our doctrine and the culture of which they are a
part by virtue of birth).85
dynamic between choice, with all of its implications for rights theory, and obligation, with
its nexus to communitarian theories. Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that much of
what he says regarding obligation can be imported into rights dialogue, particularly if we
recognize a vibrant right of association, but that is a project beyond the scope of this
article.
85. I believe that my view differs slightly from that espoused by Professor Itzhak
Englard. In a conversation that I had with Professor Englard during a recent visit to Isra-
el, Professor Englard asserted that he was born a Jew, and therefore under Jewish law, he
is a Jew as a matter of obligation. Conversation with Itzhak Englard, Professor of Law,
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in Jerusalem, Israel (May 4, 1992). His children are also
Jewish by birth and concomitant obligation. When asked, however, whether choice had a
place in his children's identity as Jews, Professor Englard stressed that he wanted them to
choose to be Jewish, as well, and to find peace with that choice even though their exer-
cise of that limited choice has little or no impact on their identity. It was clear that he
meant more than that if they leave the Jewish faith, they would retain aspects of Jewish
culture; he meant that if they were to adopt (choose) another faith, they would have
denied a part of themselves by failing to live true to their obligations as Jews. To deny
these obligations would be to disregard one's own selfhood and would itself violate con-
science. It would constitute a choice that denies one's identity as a person and a Jew -
a mixed identity of Jew and self that is inextricable and incumbent on the individual
from birth.
Such a view, recognizing as it does the supremacy of obligation and, at best, a very
limited role for choice, highlights the tension that can exist between choice-based and
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In explicating any theory of conscience, the Court must face
the kinds of issues that arise in determining whether (and to what
extent) conscience is choice or obligation based. Even if one con-
cedes there is an interactive relationship between choice and obli-
gation - one that is not necessarily mutually exclusive - it must
be conceded that the bases are not identical and tensions may arise
that will have to be dealt with in formulating doctrine based on a
theory of conscience.
d. The Textual and Originalist Problem
Given the text of the First Amendment - "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof"86 - the Court's increased reliance on
the broader term "conscience" would seem to be either ill-con-
ceived or a judicial usurpation. Historical evidence related to the
adoption of the religion provision of the First Amendment may not
support broadening of the protection afforded under the religion
provision to include matters of conscience. The evidence, however,
is ambiguous.
James Madison introduced the initial version of the Bill of
Rights, which included the following provision related to religious
liberty:
The Civil Rights of none shall be abridged *on account
of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national reli-
gion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be'in any manner, nor on any pretext infringed.
No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience.87
This provision, as introduced by Madison, sets forth a right of
conscience. The fact that the conscience language was dropped
from the version ultimately adopted and ratified, having been re-
placed with a specific reference to religion, would seem to support
the conclusion that the framers and ratifiers had considered and
rejected the use of broader conscience language.
The actual history related to the adoption of the religion provi-
obligation-based theories of conscience. it also demonstrates that government adoption of a
choice or rights based theory of conscience may constitute a preference for one religion
over another. The Jewish faith, with its reliance on obligation and near-disdain for choice
as to such matters, would be placed at some disadvantage if the government adopts a
choice-based theory of conscience.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
87. 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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sion of the First Amendment is ambiguous, however. In fact, dur-
ing the course of the debates and votes regarding various proposals
of a religion provision, the word conscience was repeatedly used
and was never directly criticized." Thus, while the right of con-
science language was dropped from the terminology of the provi-
sion ultimately adopted, it is not clear that the dropping of that
language evidences an intent on the part of the framers and ratifi-
ers to provide for a right limited to religion.
There are three reasons why the right of conscience language
could have been dropped without intending to constrain the right
being protected to the more limited category of religion. First, the
framers may have focused on protecting religion, because they felt
that it was in greater jeopardy than was a right of conscience,
which may have been less controversial (i.e., they may simply have
been trying to confirm that religious exercise was being protected,
assuming that other rights of conscience would be protected in the
process, as well).8 9 Second, in a related sense, many of the fram-
88. See, for example, id. at 758, summarizing Madison's first statement during the
debates on the religion provision:
[R]e apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not
establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel
men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience. Whether the
words are necessary or not, he did not mean to say, but they had been re-
quired by some of the State Conventions who [sic] seemed to entertain an
opinion that under the clause of the [C]onstitution, which gave power to Con-
gress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the [Con-
stitution, and the laws made under it, enabled them to make laws of such a
nature as might infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a national reli-
gion; to prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was intended ....
Id. (emphasis added). From his introductory remarks, we learn that Madison doubted
whether such an amendment was necessary to protect the right of conscience, but he
nevertheless proposed it to allay misgivings that had surfaced in many of the states.
Numerous other references to a right of conscience occurred during the course of the
debates. The initial version of the religion provision (the version proposed by Fisher
Ames) provided, "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free
exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (Jo-
seph Gales ed., 1789). The first provision considered in the Senate also included the
"infringe on rights of conscience" language. SMITH, supra note 3, at 87. Indeed, the
"rights of conscience" language was repeatedly referred to and was never disputed. The
controversy centered on other matters and language. It must be acknowledged, however,
that the Senate rejected versions of the provision that included the right of conscience
language and adopted a version that did not include that language. Id. at 88-89. Unfor-
tunately, however, the Senate record included only votes on proposals and did not include
substance of the debate itself. Similarly, there are no records of the conversations that en-
sued in the Conference Committee. For a full discussion of the debates, see id. at 73-105.
89. In a similar vein, I have previously noted that:
While the fimal provision [coming out of the Conference committee and
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ers were natural lawyers and products of the enlightenment. They
may well have believed that rights could be expanded but not
contracted (in a ratchet-like sense), and that the right of religious
exercise would be expanded to provide for a broader right of con-
science, both at the state and the national levels.9' Finally, in a
adopted by Congress] is similar to the Ames proposal, which had been adopted
in the House and which provided that "Congress shall make no law establish-
ing religion, or to preyent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the right of
conscience," there are some significant differences. To begin with, the rights-of-
conscience language is not included. It will be recalled that the version of the
amendment proposed by the Committee of Eleven ("no religion shall be estab-
lished by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed") included
the conscience language but did not include the free-exercise language. Since
there is no express indication as to why this language was deleted, one can
only speculate as to why the conference committee deleted it. It might be
argued that the provision was superfluous, since the free-exercise language
seems to support essentially the same right. On the other hand, it could be
argued with some force that the framers had specifically intended to provide
special protection to the exercise of conventional religious conviction, without
extending equal solicitude for rights of conscience that were not religious in
nature. Viewed in this light,- it may have constituted an effort to satisfy those
who were fearful that the amendment would unduly benefit the nonreligious.
Whatever justification or justifications existed for dropping the conscience lan-
guage, at a minimum it would seem likely that the framers in the conference
committee desired to make the provision sufficiently innocuous to receive ready
support in Congress and the states. In this sense, two conclusions can be
drawn. First, it would seem that the committee clearly wanted to protect the
free and equal exercise of religion but may have intentionally stopped short of
extending such broad protection of general rights of conscience. Second, even
advocates of a broad right of conscience, such as Madison, may have been
reasonably satisfied with the provision as adopted, because it was broad enough
to leave open the possibility of being elaborated into a generalized right of
conscience at some time in the future.
SMrnH, supra note 3, at 91-92.
90. I have previously distinguished between deferential originalists (judges and other
interpreters of the Constitution who look at text and history in a limiting sense - if the
text and history do not specifically permit the Court to extend a right, they are prohibited
from doing so and must defer to the majoritarian branches of govenment) and originalists
who endeavor to remain true to the natural rights or libertarian aspirations of the Framers
in interpreting the Constitution. Smith, Liberty, supra note 2, at 466-81. In that article I
defend a broader interpretation of the religion provision of the First Amendment:
[Rather than deferring to the legislature, or to democratic institutions, in decid-
ing among the various alternatives derived in an originalist analysis, a judge
should seek to maximize liberty where possible. Under such a theory, the
courts may expand individual liberty, where to do so does not otherwise unduly
jeopardize the equal liberty of another. But the judiciary may not restrict efforts
by the legislature or democratic institutions to maximize or facilitate liberty
unless those legislative efforts are clearly outside the perimeters disclosed by
originalist analysis. Such a view is consistent both with the framers' and
ratifiers' intentions (m that one accepts the perimeters established by conven-
tional originalist analysis) and their broad, overriding libertarian aspirations (in
1993"1
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
more limited sense, the use of the broader term "conscience" in
Establishment Clause analysis does much to protect against an es-
tablishment of religion - the class receiving benefits is expanded
to ensure that religion is not being directly benefited (to the exclu-
sion of other like groups) - and is, therefore, consistent with the
purposes of the establishment portion of the religion provision.
This third reason draws a distinction between the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses that deserves further, albeit brief, elabo-
ration. In this article, I have often spoken of a broad right of con-
science. However, the real issue in the Weisman and Texas Month-
ly cases is the Establishment, as opposed to the Free Exercise,
Clause. Those Establishment Clause cases have recognized a broad-
er category - that of conscience. Free exercise cases have not
broadened the protection afforded by that clause in a similar fash-
ion.91 In order to protect against establishment when the govern-
ment engages in accommodation of religion, the use of the broader
category of conscience precludes the government from preferring
religion over other forms of conscience and is consistent with the
framers' nonestablishment of religion intentions.
e. The Attenuation Problem
In a recent article, Professor Cole Durham describes the attenu-
ation of conscience problem:
One of the major hazards in our century is that the
notion of conscience is gradually becoming so broad and
vague that it is being emptied of any meaningful content.
This process began innocently enough in the conscientious
objector cases. There, the notion of conscience was defined
that in selecting from among various interpretive possibilities disclosed through
originalist analysis the judiciary remains true to the aspirations of the framers
when it engages in liberty-maximizing analysis).
Id. at 477-78; see also Suzanna Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1127 (1987) (discussing the Framers' decisionmaking approach to interpreting the
Constitution). When the history is either ambiguous or congenial to a liberty-maximizing
reading of a provision, the Court is true to the aspirations of the Framers when it so
interprets the provision. In this regard, reading the religion provision broadly to protect a
right of conscience is consistent with the libertarian aspirations of the Framers. See David
N. Mayer, The English Radical Whig Origins of American Constitutionalism, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 131 (1992); David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A
Reply to Proffessor McAffee, 16 So. ILL. L.J. 313 (1992).
91. Indeed, free exercise was severely and regrettably limited by the Court's decision
in Employment Division.v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), upholding a state prohibition on
the sacramental use of peyote.
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as "[a] sincere and meaningful [belief which] occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by
the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for
the exemption." Extending the notion of conscience in this
direction is obviously reasonable, because conscience does
not always wear religious garb. The difficulty comes when
conscience is extended to cover any deeply felt psychologi-
cal state experienced at moments of decision.'
Others have recognized the attenuation problem. Elder Dallin Oaks,
for example, has argued that, as the regulatory state has grown and
become more pervasive in the lives of the citizenry, it has had to
accommodate religious exercise, but as it has done so, with each
additional accommodation, the regulatory vortex has been widened
and free exercise has been limited.93 The irony, therefore, of ex-
panding the Establishment Clause to permit accommodations of
conscience may be that religious freedom (particularly free exer-
cise) may be subject to increased regulation. This is particularly
true when, as today, the Court is deferentialist in its theory of
judicial review - deferring to majoritarian decisions in the area of
religion and conscience.
The attenuation problem raises significant questions for the
proponent of religious liberty. If expanding accommodation under
the Establishment Clause to include matters of conscience dilutes
religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause, such an expansion
is unwarranted. 94 Care must be taken to ensure that in developing
92. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Liberty and the Call of Conscience, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 71, 85 (1993) (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965)).
93. See Dallin H. Oaks, Separation, Accommodation and the Future of Church and
State, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1985).
94. I have argued against what might be called equilibrium theories of the Free Exer-
cise and Establishment Clauses asserting that:
The equilibrium objection, or the notion that the state may expand its regulato-
ry authority to the same degree that it accommodates a right of conscience for
establishment purposes, is countered by noting that if the free exercise right
were expanded to include a wider right of conscience, together with the estab-
lishment clause, the government could be limited in its efforts to expand its
regulatory domain as to matters of conscience. Such a limitation on regulatory
authority would, at least theoretically, expand rather than contract the free exer-
cise right. . . . [R]ather than maintaining a constant equilibrium in terms of the
combined amount of exercise and accommodation that may exist in our system
at any point in time, a broader definition could expand both exercise and ac-
commodation, thereby increasing religious liberty as a whole.
Smith, Liberty, supra note 2, at 503. The broader right would arguably be less controver-
sial and would draw support from a larger political base. It would, therefore, be of great-
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a viable definition of conscience, religious liberty is not depreciat-
ed. Indeed, if recognizing conscience under the Establishment
Clause attenuates and ultimately dilutes religious freedom by pro-
viding for such a broad protected category (or group of recipients
of accommodation) that government is reluctant to provide any
accommodation, either in the form of benefits or exemptions from
sanctions, much more will have been lost than will have been
gained. By placing accommodation of matters of conscience on the
continuum between nonpreference among religions and
nonpreference between religion and nonreligion, one can get a
sense, however, that the class of recipients of the benefits of ac-
commodation can be limited so as to protect against the problem
of attenuation.
The history of the draft cases - the use of a right of con-
science as a justification for exemption from the draft during the
Vietnam war - further supports the conclusion that the attenuation
problem, while existent, may be overstated. Courts and draft boards
used conscience language to formulate exemptions for conscientious
objectors to, what was then an unpopular war. If the nation could
fight an unpopular war while providing an exemption for conscien-
tious objectors (a class broader than religious objectors), it no
doubt could provide exemptions to less significant (at least in
terms of life and death and public furor) general laws. Neverthe-
less, consideration of the attenuation problem is in order in formu-
lating a theory of conscience for First Amendment purposes.
f. The Need for the Court to Explain the Move to Conscience
In the Texas Monthly and Weisman cases, the Court evidenced
an inclination to move toward an Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence based on accommodation (in a nonpreferential way) of con-
science; however, the Justices have neither justified nor explained
the reasons supporting such a move. Conscience is a broad term,
and the Court needs to clarify the reasons why it has used the
term conscience in its recent Establishment Clause cases.
It might be maintained that there is no need for such express
clarification of purposes, because the purposes can ultimately be
gleaned from the decisions themselves on a case-by-case basis.
er appeal to the majoritarian branches of government and might well constitute a better
candidate for enactment, resulting in increased accommodation of religious and related
exercise.
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This would be true, perhaps, if the Court is making the move for
purely intuitive (as opposed to well thought out) purposes and is
willing to let the purposes distill over time. Even if the Court
prefers a course of distillation based on a series of acts of intu-
ition, the Court should clarify its purposes soon after they have
been distilled. This has not happened to date, however, and must
occur if the Court is to develop a viable theory. Purposes may
distill over time, but it would be duplicitous, or at least inappro-
priate, for the Court to refuse to acknowledge those purposes as
they develop. For litigants to understand and act upon the religion
provision, those purposes must be articulated.
g. The Problem of Non-Neutrality
The move to an Establishment Clause jurisprudence (or a uni-
fied theory - including free exercise) based on conscience is not
neutral. As demonstrated by the first continuum, nonpreference as
to matters of conscience is a choice among many alternatives. As
the prior section emphasizes, the move to conscience entails policy
choices - choices that need to be clarified, both in terms of expli-
cating the reasons for making the choice and the nature9 5 of the
choice itself.
The move is not neutral in another significant sense. As Profes-
sor Durham has noted:
[N]o sooner does one start down [the path of utilizing
conscience as the relevant category for First Amendment
purposes] than one begins to worry that the idea of con-
science may not be such a neutral idea after all. This "no-
tional institution" may be more central for Protestants than
for Catholics and Jews, and appears almost irrelevant to
certain forms of Native American religions. If this is true,
conscience may be neither as universal nor as neutral as
initial reflection might suggest.96
Durham nevertheless concludes that:
[W]e should not be too quick to dismiss conscience as a
95. By "nature," I am referring to the need to articulate the meaning of conscience
(i.e., what constitutes conscience for such purposes and what does not). The nature of
conscience with its transcendent and immanent aspects is more susceptible to case by case
elucidation than is the purpose for the move itself, which ought to be articulated at the
outset (or as soon thereafter as possible).
96. Durham, supra note 92, at 77.
1993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
central organizing category. It may well be that conscience
is experienced differently and that different importance is
attached to conscience by Protestants than by Catholics or
Jews or Native Americans. But it does not follow that it is
simply absent. The difficulty may lie more in the elusive-
ness of conscience - its affinity for concrete practical
judgment as opposed to grand system, and its tendency to
resist being bottled up in conventional moral categories.
The fact that conscience may speak several languages does
not mean that it does not speak.97
While the problem of the very neutrality of the concept of con-
science might be avoided on grounds like those articulated by Dur-
ham, such grounds merely beg anew prior questions. First, is it
possible or viable to define conscience broadly enough to include
all religious traditions and more? Second, if defining conscience so
broadly is possible and viable, how are the problems of transcen-
dence and immanence (i.e., to use Durham's phrase, "its tendency
to resist being bottled up in conventional moral categories") and of
attenuation to be resolved?
h. Edification and the Role of Conscience:
The Merits of the Task
There are many reasons why the Court's apparent efforts to
accommodate conscience are noteworthy and may be of significant
benefit. Some of the benefits of an obligation-based (a heightened
sense of responsibility and the building of community) and a
choice-based (autonomy and the development of self) theory of
conscience were previously highlighted.98 There are other benefits
as well.
If one concedes that there are limits to the noetic enterprise as
a means of resolving many of the major personal and political
issues that we confront in contemporary society,99 there must be a
role for other forms of dialogue. Professor Michael J. Perry has
proposed what he terms "ecumenical politics," which he describes
as a politics "in which beliefs about human good, including disput-
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limits of ra-
tional or analytic discourse in resolving many of the major issues that must be faced in
today's complex world.
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ed beliefs are central."'0° Perry goes on to argue that ecumenical
politics are necessarily dialogical in nature"°1 and that there are
many reasons why such dialogue should be taken seriously."°
Even the proponent of purely rational analysis might acknowl-
edge that the facilitation of conscience-based moral dialogue may
be of benefit. Put otherwise, she might concede that there may (as
opposed to must) be something to such dialogue - that rationality
may have its limits as a means of resolving some significant issues
that must, nevertheless, be decided in the political sphere (e.g.,
abortion). 3 Such issues have to be decided, however provisional-
ly, and rational discourse has not proven capable of giving us even
a tentative shared answer. The proponent of rational analysis and
dialogue might concede, therefore, that conscience-based dialogue
may assist participants in the decisionmaking process.
In the concluding portions of this section, I would like to
elaborate a fifth reason why such "ecumenical political dialogue"
(to use Perry's term) or "conscience-based political dialogue" (to
use a term more congenial to the substance of this article) is
worthwhile. I refer to that benefit as the benefit of edification.
To edify is to "instruct and improve [especially] in moral and
religious knowledge[; to] enlighten."0 4 Edification has its deriva-
100. PERRY, supra note 7, at 43.
101. Id. at 127. Perry notes that, "the principal constituents of ecumenical politics are
two practices: a certain kind of dialogue and a certain kind of tolerance." Id. For an
elaboration of the nature of and benefits derived from ecumenical dialogue, see id. at 83-
127.
102. Perry's reasons include: (1) a political community that permits members of different
religious and moral communities to make political choices and engage in politics must
have a common dialogue if it is to avoid political violence; (2) we come to "the truest
knowledge of ourselves - of who we truly are, both as individuals and as members of
communities, and of how we should therefore live our lives, of what choices we should
make - dialogically, not monologically;" (3) we come to "the fullest knowledge of our-
self as thus embedded [in a complex network of independent human relationships] - of
who I am in relation to others, of what I need or desire from others, of what is being
asked or demanded of me by others, of what I have to offer others, and so on -
dialogically, not monologically;" and (4) "Any community or person for which or whom
love of neighbor is a constitutive ideal should understand that openness to the Other -
to the stranger, the outsider - in deliberative dialogue facilitates as well as expresses
such love: I can hardly love the Other - the real other, in all her particularity - unless
I listen to her and, in listening, gain in knowledge of her, of who she truly is and what
she needs or desires; and unless having listened, I then respond to her." Id. at 49-50.
It is interesting that Perry offers reasons supporting such dialogue that draw on both
the obligation-based (responsibility and community) and choice-based (autonomy) justifica-
tions for a right of conscience.
103. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
104. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 723 (1986).
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tion in the Latin term "aedificare," which has been defined as "to
instruct or improve spiritually... to erect a house."' Con-
science-based dialogue has a potential of edifying, of improving the
dialogue regarding moral matters. To extend the house metaphor a
bit, analytical reasoning provides us with the materials and many
of the plans necessary to build a moral house, but conscience-based
dialogue can edify (i.e. help us complete the house, at least until
the next addition, renovation or demolition is in order).
When all else fails in bringing us the provisional cloture neces-
sary on moral issues, like abortion or nuclear armament, turning to
conscience-based contributions to the dialogue may help. Some
issues are so richly complex and involve so many different values
that enlightenment may need to be sought from other non- or
extra-rational sources such as conscience. Conscience-based dia-
logue in this sense may have the further virtue of performing a
melding function whereby the heart and the mind become one in
purpose."os While I use the term edification because it seems to
capture the melding of mind and heart, the term inspiration might
also be descriptive of this process. There are times, for example,
when, after much contemplation, I am unable to resolve perplexing
problems but, later on, I am able to resolve the problem in a mo-
ment of inspiration. In that moment I come to understand the
course I should follow - my heart and mind are unified in pur-
pose, and my understanding is enlightened.
A nonpersonal example is in order. After initially assuming the
leadership role in the Montgomery bus boycott, Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. became disheartened and fearful over the ramifications
(both seen and unseen) of his role. One particularly troubling night,
after having received a late night call (one of many) threatening
his life,"07 Dr. King relates that he had the following experience:
I sat there and thought about a beautiful little daughter
who had just been born .... She was the darling of my
105. Id.
106. One of my favorite scriptures refers to this process. In the Gospel of Luke, it is
recorded that shortly after the birth of Christ and the occurrence of a number of prophetic
events, Mary "kept all these things, and pondered them in her heart." Luke 2:19 (King
James). The heart assisted in the pondering process, a process typically conceived of as
residing in the mind.
107. David J. Carrow, King's biographer, notes that Dr. King was "rattled" when the
caller threatened, "Nigger, we are tired of you and your mess now[, a]nd if you aren't
out of this town in three days, we're going to blow your brains out, and blow up your
house." DAVID J. CARROW, BEARING THE CRoss 57-58 (1988).
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life. I'd come in night after night and see that little gentle
smile. And I sat at that table thinking about that little girl
and thinking about the fact that she could be taken away
from me any minute.
And I started thinking about a dedicated, devoted and
loyal wife, who was over there asleep. And she. could be
taken from me, or I could be taken from her. And I got to
the point that I couldn't take it any longer. I was weak.
Something said to me, you can't call on Daddy now, he's
up in Atlanta a hundred and seventy-five miles away. You
can't even call on Mama now. You've got to call on that
something in that person that your Daddy used to tell you
about, that power that can make a way out of no way.
And I discovered then that religion had to become real
to me, and I had to know God for myself. And I bowed
down over that cup of coffee. I never will forget it ... I
prayed a prayer, and I prayed out loud that night. I said,
'Lord, I'm down here trying to do what's right. I think I'm
right. I think the cause that we represent is right. But Lord,
I must confess that I'm weak now. I'm faltering. I'm los-
ig my courage. And I can't let the people see me like this
because if they see me weak and losing my courage, they
will begin to get weak.'"1 8
Then, after, this prayer, King notes that:
[I]t seemed at that moment that I could hear an inner voice
saying to me, 'Martin Luther, stand up for righteousness.
Stand up for justice. Stand up for truth. And lo I will be
with you, even until the end of the world.' . . . I heard the
voice of Jesus saying still to fight on. He promised never
to leave me, never to leave me alone."
This experience gave Dr. King new strength. He had reached clo-
ture - he was certain as to the course he should follow."1
I would submit that this experience for Dr. King decided that
he had to continue to lead the boycott constitutes a classic case of
the kind of edification that comes from a conscience-based dia-
logue, whether with one's self or with others. Dr. King went into
108. Id. at 58.
109. Id.
110. As to this experience, Dr. King states that, "Almost at once my fears began to go.
My uncertainty disappeared." Id.
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the room undecided, but inclined as a rational matter, to give up
his leadership role for his family's sake. While reflecting upon this
possibility and his fear, Dr. King's conscience made it possible for
him to reach provisional cloture in his dialogue with himself on a
pressing moral issue.
On another level, it is evident that Dr. King's conscience-based
involvement in the boycott, and in the civil rights movement gen-
erally, informed the national dialogue. His words, filled as they
were with hope and understanding and motivated by a deep com-
mitment to conscience, performed an edifying function in our na-
tional dialogue. He was able to edify others - religious and non-
religious alike - to help them come to provisional cloture regard-
ing civil rights. Thus, conscience can edify, individually and collec-
tively. A call to one's conscience, especially when spoken in a
form consistent with an ecumenical public dialogue of the sort
Professor Michael Perry favors, can assist us in dealing with press-
ing social and moral issues - it can help bring us as a political
community to provisional cloture.
What happens, however, when one loses - when one speaks
from conscience in the public discourse and then loses when the
decision is made? Is the downside of losing in such a dialogue so
high that we should preclude participants in the dialogue from
speaking from conscience? I think not for three reasons. First, as
previously noted, precluding one from sharing those ideas in a
form that may edify is to limit the dialogue in ways that may
prevent us from reaching provisional cloture .in public discourse on
issues that must be decided, however tentatively. Second, to permit
some to speak from ideology, with all its excesses, while preclud-
ing others from speaking from conscience may be more offensive
to the conscience-based speaker than losing. Third, and relatedly, if
the dialogue is governed by principles of respect for other views,
which includes efforts to understand and be edified by the views of
others,111 a sense of due process will be felt by all participants.
They will appreciate that their voices were heard and understood
even though they may have been provisionally rejected. Such rejec-
tions, while poignant and personally trying, are not necessarily
debilitating.
111. Perry also advocates that the dialogue should be governed by two "cardinal
dialogic virtues: public intelligibility and public accessibility." PERRY, supra note 7, at
105.
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Given that there would seemingly be at least as much lost by
precluding conscience-based dialogue from the public discourse as
there would be from permitting it to have a place in such dialogue,
and given the potential for edification th4t may attend the admit-
ting of such dialogue to the public discourse, there are few reasons
other than outright hostility to permitting matters of conscience to
contribute to the public discourse that would justify such exclusion.
This is not, of course, to discount the need for limitations like
those set forth by Professor Perry in governing such dialogue." 2
Indeed, those limits should be included on the Court's agenda in
formulating a conscience-based First Amendment doctrine.
B. Coercion
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Weisman, utilized
the concept of coercion in developing an Establishment Clause
test.'13 As was the case with the Court's utilization of the term
conscience, the use of coercion raises a number of questions that
will have to be resolved in the elaboration of a viable Establish-
ment Clause analysis or theory. In this section, I briefly raise those
issues.
1. The Need for a Definition of Coercion
As was the case with the term conscience, the notion of coer-
cion must be defined. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and
Justice Scalia's dissent both applied a coercion analysis. Justice
Kennedy refers to subtle coercion in invalidating the graduation
prayer in Weisman,"4 while Justice Scalia relies on direct proof
of actual coercion." 5 While a definition of what counts as coer-
cion may be distilled through a series of cases, the Court should
confront the definitional issue at the outset, in order to inform
112. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 83-127. I may not agree with all of the limits set by
Perry, but I think his exhaustive study provides a very sound starting point; providing a
better point of departure than those proposed by individuals who would exclude con-
science-based dialogue; see Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 43 CASE W. RES. L., REV. 963 (1993), or those who would permit
it without limit, in hopes that it might entirely coopt or control the dialogue, turning our
nation into a theocratic state.
113. The use of coercion is not new. Justice Potter Stewart relied on such a test in
developing his Establishment Clause analysis in numerous cases. See Rodney K. Smith,
Justice Potter Stewart: A Contemporary Jurist's View of Religious Liberty, 59 N.D. L.
REV. 183, 192-94 (1983).
114. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2652-61 (1992).
115. Id. at 2678-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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litigants regarding the nature of record necessary to prove coercion.
2. The Need for a Theory of Coercion
The Court needs to formulate a theory of coercion. 16 Coer-
cion can be normative and not merely descriptive - a definition
of coercion without an exploration of the theoretical underpinnings
of such a definition will be insufficient.
Coercion may be defined as being forced to act against one's
will. That definition, however, begs the question - it simply sub-
stitutes will for coercion, leaving will undelineated - and fails to
recognize that law often (perhaps, always) coerces in some respect.
Law coerces by limiting choices or reallocating resources, benefit-
ing some and burdening others, thereby influencing their choices. A
viable definition of coercion will have to be supplemented with a
theory that explains why some government actions, coercing as
they must, are acceptable and others are not.
The theory will also have to take into account the extent to
which private as well as public coercion is permissible. Culture and
even biology (our genetic makeup) may be said to be coercive.
The same sorts of problems with transcendence and immanence
that are faced in the context of explicating the term conscience will
also have to be faced in developing a viable theory of coercion.
Coercion, without definitional and theoretical elaboration, is an
unbridled term. Indeed, it is by its nature expansive. Government,
culture and nature alike coerce at virtually every turn. Coercion,
therefore, needs to be defined and combined with some other term
such as conscience or religion to determine whether that which is
to be protected is being coerced and whether that specific form of
coercion is permissible." 7
3. Developmental and Related Problems
One of the -most perplexing issues raised in the context of the
religion provision of the First Amendment has to do with children
and their development of the tools necessary to become expressive
116. See ALAN R. WHITE, GROUNDS OF LIABILIY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW 48-62 (1985) (demonstrating that voluntariness, involuntariness, and non-
voluntariness are conceptually distinct).
117. Professor Michael Paulsen's article is a good initial effort to explicate a theory of
coercion, although his theoretical exposition seems to fail to recognize the explicit limits
on coercion as a useful term when it is used without reference to what is being coerced.
See Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 795 (1993).
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individuals (to become autonomous in any meaningful sense). Put
otherwise, serious issues regarding the autonomy of children, in
light of the role of parents and government, 'often arise. Govern-
ment no doubt has a significant role in assuring that children gain
the tools necessary to become expressive, autonomous individuals.
This role, which is largely effectuated by mandatory schooling,
however, can put the government into direct conflict with the role
of the family and the church or other similar groups and institu-
tions."' In coercion terms, government must assume some role in
insuring that children are given the tools necessary to make choices
in the first instance, even though this role is itself coercive. In
some sense, nevertheless, this role is prior to any coercion analysis.
How can a law coerce one's choice if one does not have the tools
necessary to make an informed choice in the first instance? In
other senses, it is inextricable from any coercion analysis because
the tools of expression (reading and writing, for example) are im-
bedded in the teaching process and that process is itself coercive in
some measure at nearly every turn. For example, one may have to
learn to read to make choices from the panoply of alternatives
available in contemporary society, but the selection of the materials
used to teach reading is itself potentially coercive. One does not
simply learn to read, one also learns from the substance of that
which he or she is reading, and that learning can be coercive in
that the substance read may influence choices to be made. Thus, in
118. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-214 (1972) (balancing the reli-
gious interests of parents and children with the State's interest in education). In a related
sense, Bruce C. Hafen has argued that:
Individuals are not left totally to their own resources in the personal quest for
purpose. The right freely to pursue personal meaning is embodied primarily in
the values of the First Amendment, which are usually regarded as a set of
individual liberties. Yet the tradition of the First Amendment also recognizes
and protects certain intermediate structures - those "intellectual and moral
associatons" - that are carriers of meaning and developers of the tools neces-
sary to explore meaning. Thus, the First Amendment and related constitutional
sources should protect not only individual religious liberty, but the institutional
liberty of churches; not only personal academic freedom, but the institutional
liberty of schools and colleges; not only individual freedom of speech, but the
associational or institutional freedom of groups and newspapers; not only the
personal right to seek meaning and education, but the institutional role of the
family to direct the moral, intellectual, and spiritual development of its children.
The "little platoons" are a deliberate part of the structure, for they nurture the
values that ultimately sustain the entire system - as well as sustaining the
personal quest of each citizen.
Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public
Schools As Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 698 (1987) (citation omitted).
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examining which types of coercion are acceptable for definitional
and theoretical purposes, the Court will have to explore the impli-
cations for individual development, as well as for government,
fatinily, churches and other similar institutions inherent in any such
enterprise.
V. COERCION AND CONSCIENCE IN THE WEISMAN CASE
The Court did not fare particularly well in raising or respond-
ing to the sorts of questions raised in the preceding sections re-
garding conscience and coercion in rendering its decision in
Weisman. Neither Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, nor
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, offered much if any definitional
or theoretical support for their respective positions. What may be
learned must be gleaned from examining the interplay between the
incomplete doctrinal exposition contained in the various opinions
and the application of that doctrine to the particular facts of the
case.
119
In his opinion, Justice Kennedy refers to coercion and to con-
science. He defines neither term, however, nor does he do much to
place either term in its historical context, as a matter of precedent
or textual exegesis. Justice Scalia does not fare much better. While
he refrains from analyzing conscience at all, preferring to focus on
what he considers to be actual coercion, and after ridiculing Justice
Kennedy for relying on psychological and related materials, 2 '
Justice Scalia's analysis turns simply on his assertion, which is
little more than an ipse dixit, that there was no proof of actual
coercion in the record.'
Given the lack of rigor in the analyses and the paucity of
justificatory theory set forth in the opinions in Weisman,22 one
119. It must be noted that the Weisman case did not arise in a vacuum; other cases
have influenced its doctrinal direction. A full examination of those cases, however, is
beyond the scope of this article.
120. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2681 (1992).
121. Id. at 2683.
122. What the justices did in Weisman, however, is not unlike what they do in virtually
all cases, especially cases that are decided during a period of major or revolutionary doc-
trinal change or flux. See Robert I. Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68
NEB. L. REV. 701, 705-07 (1989) (arguing that courts decide cases based on pragmatism
as well as coherence with past precedent). This may be a very sensible way of permitting
doctrine and theory to develop. However, at some point during the course of that devel-
opment the questions raised in the preceding sections will have to be answered. They
should also be grist for the thinking processes of the Justices as they consider future
cases, in which doctrine and theory will evolve.
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would have to engage in speculation to try to derive answers from
the opinions to the questions raised in the preceding sections of
this article. It may be enough, for present purposes, therefore, to
indicate that the very presence of the term of conscience, juxta-
posed as it is to the notion of coercion in Weisman, may reveal
that new Establishment Clause doctrine and theory may be in its
incipient stages.
V. CONCLUSION
I am pleased that the Supreme Court is beginning to utilize the
term conscience in its Establishment Clause analysis."z While
there are many issues that must be resolved, including the relation-
ship between the notions of conscience and coercion, this move in
the Establishment Clause concept may well be a good one. By
addressing some of the issues raised in this article, Justice Kennedy
and others favoring such an approach might do much to solidify
the role of a conscience-based theory in developing Establishment
Clause doctrine. We may even one day have a theory of substance
sufficient to put an end to the wandering of a wayward judiciary
in its effort to formulate coherent Establishment Clause doctrine.
123. Unfortunately, the Court is less willing to use the same language in the free exer-
cise context. In fact, given how deferential the Court has been to the majoritarian branch-
es of governn6nt in regulating religious matters, so long as other rights are not involved
or there is no evidence of actual intent to discriminate against a religion or group of reli-
gions, the use of conscience may be particularly significant. Since the Court is so inclined
to permit the majoritarian branches of government great latitude in the free exercise area,
proponents of First Amendment freedom may have to turn their energy to efforts like the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act to maintain a vibrant right of conscience. When the
majoritarian branches act in this regard to accommodate religion or conscience, they will
be subject to the strictures of the Establishment Clause, which I argue throughout this
article now require that the class protected be broadened to include like forms of con-
science. If the Court continues to minimize protection under the Free Exercise Clause, the
day may soon be upon us that the Court's entire work relative to the religion provision
of the First Amendment will focus on the Establishment Clause and that work will be
conscience-based (i.e., if the government act accommodates conscience in a nonpreferential
manner, it will be permitted).
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